INDIA’S FREEDOM – VICTORY OF THE VANQUISHED INA
[First Released – 04/07/2012; Last Edited – 18/06/13]
1.Introduction
Quite a large number of authors across the world, including many eminent ones (e.g. H Toye1, M Edwardes2, K K Ghosh3, J. Lebra4, G H Corr5, R C Majumdar6, Sumit Sarkar7, T R Sareen8, Bipan Chandra9, L Gordon10, P W Fay11and C Bayly12) are of the view that the INA phenomenon played the most (one of the most at the least) important role(s) in compelling the British regime to leave India.
The Indian National Army (INA) led by Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose, as is widely known, was vanquished in its Imphal campaign(March – July 1944) even after a spectacular initial success. The achievements and failures of the INA in the battle fields, however, are to be viewed in the proper perspective to pass a fair judgment.13
Anyway, ultimately, the INA became the real victor during the transportation of the captivated INA men across India, and particularly during and around the historic INA Trials(November 1945 – February 1946) – which, in the period between October 1945 and March 1946
a)generated the hitherto greatest, though spontaneous, mass upsurge against the Trials and the British Raj, irrespective of caste, creed and religion, throughout the length and breadth of the Indian sub-continent,
b)changed the loyalty of the Indian members of the British Indian forces from the alien rulers to their motherland – which shook the very foundation of the empire, and
c)gave rise to an extremely explosive political atmosphere with the possibility of the Indian freedom movement being taken over by revolutionary forces – which would have been highly detrimental to the interests of both the British regime and the Indian National Congress, and which was beyond the capacity of the Government to contain as Indian forces could not be relied upon whereas purely British forces and the British economy were shattered by the war.
The His Majesty’s Government(HMG) of United Kingdom realized that they had to leave India as soon as possible. The situation was exploited very shrewdly by the Congress (and the Muslim League) to achieve their goals. “Transfer of Power”, with dominion status and partition, was implemented through negotiations by the British Government in a lightening speed.
The happenings, including related analyses, of this period have been more or less covered by the authors already named. While some authors have just touched the matter, some others viz. Sarkar7, Sareen8, Chandra9 and Fay11 have made fairly detailed studies. The most comprehensive presentations, however, have been made by K.K. Ghosh3 amongst those already named, and G.C. Maity14. These two expositions, each of about 50 pages, having references to numerous original sources, have clearly established what have been told above. Maity could also consult and cite various British documents regarding India declassified and published during 1970–83 in twelve volumes entitled “INDIA – The Transfer of Power 1942-47”(Volume VI in particular).
In this discourse, there would be an attempt to re-explore this subject with many additional evidences, and present the outcome in a very concise form. It may please be noted that emphasis (by italicization etc) on some texts has been put by the present author unless stated otherwise.
2.The Impact of INA Affairs
2.1 Introduction
The stupendous effect of the movements regarding the INA trials would now be described in brief. The matter generated such far-reaching consequences in the Indian freedom struggle that it should be called a phenomenon.
While this Section(No. 2) contains a general exposition of the matter, more would be presented in the next Section(No. 3). It may be added here that out of a very large number of facts and evidences only a few have been chosen to make this exposition a very short one.
It is important to note that the political atmosphere in India during the period from mid-1944 to mid-1945 was very dull. The August 1942 movement had long been petered out. The Congress leaders were released from custody. Negotiations failed between the Congress and the Muslim League (regarding future power structure) on the one hand and between national leaders and the Government(regarding future constitution) on the other. There was no scope of starting another mass movement. The Congress was contemplating to embark on social work.15
2.2 Indian Populace
From around the middle of 1945 transportations of the INA POWs across India took place. The people were able to come in contact with them. Moreover, information regarding various shining facets of Netaji and INA began to be unveiled and published in the newspapers. This resulted into the generation of stupendous mass enthusiasm and support regarding the INA men. This situation gave the Congress the much needed political opportunity to be with the masses.
Then, on 5 November 1945, the historic first INA trial, involving Major Gen. Shah Nawaz Khan, Lt. Col. P.K. Sahgal and Lt. Col. G.S. Dhillon – a Muslim, a Hindu and a Sikh respectively, started. The choice of three men from the three main religious communities of India and the choice of the Red Fort as the venue acted as a perfect backdrop to arouse national sentiment. It is to be recalled here that the Red Fort had long been regarded as the citadel of power in India, Moreover, Netaji’s celebrated clarion call was “Dilli Chalo”(i,e. ”On To Delhi”), and the last stanza of “Kadam Kadam Barhaye Ja”(i.e.”March Forward”), the famous march song of the INA, calls the soldiers to hoist the Indian Tri-colour atop the Red Fort. The British Raj contemplated to cow down the Indian masses by inflicting injury to their national pride. Contrary to the British expectation, the whole country burst into protests.
The Congress defended the INA men in the Military Tribunal. Interestingly enough, though anti-Subhas and anti-INA in its core, the Congress supported the INA in its entire endeavour – praising the men as patriots of the highest order – the legitimacy of the Provisional Government of Free India(PGFI) and its taking military assistance from Japan, right to fight for freedom etc. Tej Bahadur Sapru, Bhulabhai Desai, K.N. Katju, Jawaharlal Nehru, Asaf Ali and some others acted as defense counsels. Nehru robed in barrister’s gown after 25 years. Mosley has sarcastically said – “Never before so many Indian politicians so quickly remembered that they were lawyers”. In actuality, however, the proceedings were led, and conducted solely by Desai.16 The motive of the Congress was, of course, only to exploit the prevailing situation.17
Anyway, as a consequence, thanks to the nationalist press, facts about Netaji, and the PGFI and INA including their vast organizational structure, independent status, remarkable achievements etc., concealed very carefully so far by the Government, were being exposed in a big way. There was a spontaneous mass upheaval against the trials throughout India, including in the remotest villages, involving people of all communities, caste and creed. Numerous meetings( attended, on their own, by several thousands to several lacs of people depending on the place), processions, etc. were held. Sometimes, there had been violent confrontations with the authorities.
There were two more crescendos of this mass movement – one starting on 11 February 1946 to protest against the seven year sentence to the INA officer Capt. Rashid Ali, and another starting on 18 February when the ratings of the Royal Indian Navy went on strike(to be described in the Section 2.4).
Other political parties also, including the Communist Party of India though after some initial reluctance and later through its student wing, took part in the agitations.18
2.3 Indian Armed Forces
The influence of the INA on the Indian members of the British Indian forces (Army, Navy and Air Force) was more catastrophic to the British regime.
Hugh Toye19, a British intelligence officer during the World War II, has written that during the surrender(starting from May 1945 in Burma) of INA men in South East Asia, the Indians in the British Indian forces came into direct contact with them. Civilian Indians then undertook highly effective publicity regarding Netaji and INA. He added “– – – -. Its result was a political consciousness which the Indian Servicemen had never before possessed.”
This consciousness grew more and more during the return of INA prisoners to India and the trials. The servicemen, often in their uniforms, used to attend the public meetings on the INA issue, sent subscriptions to their cause and so on. Lt. Gen. Francis Tuker, the GOC of the Eastern Command, had observed – “- – the INA affair was- – threatening to tumble down the whole edifice of the Indian Army”.20
As has been presented by Ghosh21, approximately 95% of the Indian Officers (about eight thousand in total) became pro-INA. Gen. Claude Auchinlek, Commander-in-Chief of the British Indian forces wrote to Field Marshall Archibald Wavell, the Viceroy on 26 November 1945 that “I do not think any senior British officer today knows what is the real feeling among the Indian ranks regarding INA- – – – there is a growing feeling of sympathy for the INA”. In February 1946, in a secret note to the British officers (defending his commuting sentence to the first three INA officers) he wrote “- – – – any attempt to force the sentence would have led to chaos in the country at large and probably to mutiny and desertion in the army culminating in its dissolution – – – – “.
2.4 RIN Revolt
A supremely important event of this period was the revolt in the Royal Indian Navy (RIN) which started on 18 February 1946. The RIN ratings stroke work on various demands – redressal of the grievances regarding racial discrimination, financial and related issues, release of all INA prisoners, and abandonment of the INA trials. This involved about 20,000 ratings, 78 out of 88 ships and 20 shore establishments out of 22. The revolt was however put down quickly, aided by the Congress.22
There were also mass movements supporting the RIN revolt. The reverberations of this revolt were felt in the other wings of the armed forces. The personnel of the Royal Indian Air Force and some units of the Army went on strike at different centres.23
On 27 February 1946, in a private secret note to F.W. Pethick-Lawrence, the Secretary of State for India of the His Majesty’s Government (HMG), Wavell wrote – “and finally, the hero-worship of the INA officers who were convicted and released has almost put a premium on indiscipline”.24
As was pointed out by the Commission appointed by the Government, one of the most important factors responsible for this upsurge was the INA – rating’s contact with INA men and the Azad Hind literature in Singapore, Malaya and Burma, attending political meetings on INA trials etc.25
2.5 Observations of Gandhi, Nehru and Sitaramayya
It would be illuminating to have some glimpses of the assessments of the situation made by the political stalwarts of the period.
Gandhi, in an article in Harijan (15 February 1946), wrote – “The Hypnotism of the Indian National Army has cast its spell on us. Netaji’s name is one to conjure with.- – – . The lesson that Netaji and his army bring to us is one of self sacrifice, unity irrespective of class and community, and discipline”. Interestingly, he added “I knew his action was bound to failure – – – even if he had brought his INA victorious to India, because the masses would not have come into their own in this manner”. But he also observed previously “The whole country has been roused, and even the regular forces have been stirred into a new political consciousness and have begun to think in terms of independence.”26
Nehru, in a speech at Lucknow on 04 October 1945, advised the people – “Forget all your slogans. Adopt the two slogans of the INA, which are Delhi Chalo and Jai Hind”. He, again, in a speech at Patna on 24 December 1945, said “- – – – – the trial has taken us many steps forward on our path to freedom. Never before in Indian History had such unified sentiments and feelings been manifested by various divergent sections of the Indian populations- – – – – . it has broken the impenetrable barriers that separated earlier the Government-controlled Indian Army and public opinion.” He, in a letter dated 04 May 1946, to Auchinlek, Commander-in-Chief of the British Indian Forces, wrote “- – – – No political organization, however strong and efficient, could have produced this enormous reaction in India- – – – – . This kind of thing is not done and can not be done by politicians or agitators – – – – ”. 27
Pattavi Sitaramayya (defeated by Subhas in 1939 Congress Presidential election, though being Gandhi’s candidate), the Congress historian, wrote – “.- – – – – It looked as though the INA itself eclipsed the Indian National Congress and the exploits of war and violence abroad threw intoobscurity the victories of non-violence at home”. 28
However, the Congress leaders, every now and then, branded the INA men as “misguided“ even though, Nehru and Patel sometimes vowed to induct them in the Army of free India, and reiterated their faith in “non violence” although sometimes inciting and praising violence.17 It is also a fact that the earlier movements by the Congress were not always non-violent.29
2.6 Netaji’s Strategy
Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose, even if considered as only a dreamer, never thought that he would be able to reach Delhi with his 40,000 or so men with the support of Japan, when the fortunes of the Axis powers were dwindling. He did expect, nevertheless, that the advances of the INA in the Indian soil would trigger a mass upsurge, including switching of loyalty of the British Indian forces from the British Crown to their motherland. This, in turn, would compel the British regime to retreat, and nullify any Japanese attempt to dominate. Thus, his objective was more political than militaristic.30(i)
But most unfortunately, it did not happen then. The INA had to retreat from the outskirts of Imphal due to various reasons. The Government, in association with its Indian collaborators, was able to shut all information regarding the momentous achievements of the INA from the public, and the armed forces were kept under control by branding Netaji as a fascist and a puppet of Japan and his men as traitors – although its intelligence reports painted diametrically opposite pictures.30(ii)
The cherished events happened at last. But, unfortunately enough, the colossus at the helm of affairs was nowhere in sight then.
3.The Responses of the HMG
3.1 Introduction
The continuously down-sliding stands of the HMG regarding India consequential to the prevailing situations would now be stated in brief chronologically. However, the climb down of the British Government Of India (BGOI) regarding the number of INA men to be tried and convicted, and the amount of punishments to be meted out has not been covered. This can be found elsewhere.31
It is to be noted here that the new Labour Government under C R Attlee took over from 26 July 1945 when the Second World War was still on in the eastern theatre – Japan announced surrender to the Allies on 14 August 1945.
3.2 The First Step – Election Announced
On 20 August 1945, the British Cabinet decided that the Viceroy should announce that the elections to the central and provincial legislatures in India would be held in the ensuing winter as per the GOI Act 1935. However, it was kept a secret that the Viceroy was also advised to take the first step to implement the offer of 1942 (Cripps’ Proposal), i.e. appointment of an electoral college out of elected members, which with the representatives of the Indian Princely States, would form a constitution-making body.
The announcement was made on 21 August 1945.32
3.3 The Second Step –Cripps’ Proposal Reiterated
The enthusiasms and interests in the INA and Netaji were increasing day by day as were reported by the nationalist press and the Government intelligence agencies.
On 2 September 1945, the Acting Viceroy John Colville reported to Pethick-Lawrence – “Bose has come in for much praise as a national hero, and the nationalist press is suggesting that under international law Bose and his followers are entitled to all the honours of war and are not liable of punishment”.33
On 19 September 1945, Wavell, the then Viceroy, returning back from London after consultation with the HMG, unveiling the previous secrecy, promised (in a broadcast speech) “early realization of self-government in India”, described a detailed scheme, and said he would undertake discussions with the Indian leaders in this regard. The proposals were – restoring responsible government in the provinces, setting up a constitution-making body, working towards implementing a treaty between Britain and India, and setting up an Executive Council(in the Central Government) having support of the main Indian parties etc. This offer was, by and large, similar to that proposed by Stafford Cripps in 1942 (March – April). This would have lead to some kind of self governance. The scheme had many lacunae, eg., the term “independence” was carefully avoided, there was no clear promise of immediate transfer of power, people of the Princely States were ignored etc.34
This, as the Cripps’ proposal of 1942, was rejected by the Congress. The All India Congress Committee, in its meeting on 21 September 1945, resolved – “Neither the end of the war nor the change of Government in Great Britain appears to have resulted in any real change in British policy towards India- – – – ”.35
3.4 The Third Step– Parliamentary Delegation
3.4.1 Background
The political atmosphere of the country preceding, during and after the first INA trial(which started on 5 November 1945) has already been described[Vide Section 2]. Penderel Moon, the editor of “The Viceroy’s Journal” has used the caption “The Edge of a Volcano” to name its chapter covering the events from September to December 1945. The phrase was coined by Wavell himself on the basis of the DIB’s intelligence.36
On 6 November, Wavell, in a Memorandum to Pethick-Lawrence wrote – “I believe that the Congress are counting on the INA as the spear-head of their revolt; they would suborn the Indian Army if they could, and they hope that their threats will impair the loyalty and efficiency of the Police”.37 He also expected that the HMG would suppress disturbances by any means and adequate resources (meaning troops etc.) would be provided. Wavell showed this note to Field Marshall Alan Alanbrooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, who was in Delhi on 5 November. Alanbrooke agreed that such a note should be given, but “had no idea where the troops would come from if we wanted them”.38
On 14 November, the Secretary of State submitted a Memorandum to the Cabinet. He thought it prudent not to further inflame the already explosive situation. He suggested – “a statement should be prepared now with a view to use it if necessary at an appropriate agreed time later on”. He also proposed to enquire into the availability of more British troops to suppress disorder.39
On 20 November 1945, the BGOI (Home Deptt.), in a secret note to the Political Department, India Office, London concluded –
“(1) the public feeling which exist is one of sympathy for the INA- – – – -.
(2) the measure of sympathy is substantial and is not confined to towns or to any particular community- – – – –
(3)- – – – -.Counter propaganda would be of doubtful value at this stage.
(4) the possibility of the development of the agitation in dangerous directions exists in degree which demands constant watchfulness and
(5) the threat to the security of the Indian Army is one which it would be unwise to ignore”.40
On 24 November 1945, Auchinlek (in reply to a query dated 11 November made by the Chiefs of Staff of the British forces if Indian forces could be relied upon in case of a revolt) reported that large scale disorder was unlikely before April 1946. However in such a case the ex-INA men could take a very important part. He also wrote “if and when trouble comes it may be of greater scale than in August 1942”. In conclusion, he asked for preparing a plan to dispatch British Formations from outside India.41
The State of Affairs of the Indian Army at that time including Auchinlek’s assessment have already been presented in Section 2.3 above.
3.4.2 Announcement
The HMG, of course, refused to take a path of confrontation as there was a very bleak prospect of the armed forces and economy of Britain devastated by the war to sustain such a course.
On 4 December 1945, the decision of the Cabinet to send a Parliamentary Delegation to India was announced in the British Parliament. The objectives were “to meet leading Indian political personalities to learn their own views at first hand” and “to convey in person the general wish and desire of the people of this country that India should speedily attain her full and rightful position as an independent partner State in the British Commonwealth”. There was, of course, a show of brave face by stating – “the future constitution of India should not be called into being by force or threat of force”.42
3.4.3 Visit and Observations
The Parliamentary Delegation, consisting of ten MPs from different political parties of Britain,
visited India for about five weeks from 5 January 1946.
On 13 February 1946, in a meeting held in Attlee’s official residence(10,Downing Street, London) the members expressed their views. Some of them were43 –
(1)Mr. Richards – “Both Congress and Muslim league wish the British get out of India. There are two
alternative ways of meeting this common desire (a) that we should arrange to get out, (b) that we should want to be driven out (in regard to (b), the loyalty of the Indian Army is open to question).
(2)Lord Chorley – “The INA trials had had a bad effect on the Army but it was reliable still for dealing
with riots but not for anything more serious”.
(3)Brigadier Low – “…Nevertheless on the whole the army could be relied upon to do its duty except in case of a civil war, in which case its loyalty would inevitably be divided among the combatants”.
On 13 March 1946, R.W. Sorensen wrote to Pethick-Lawrence, while saying that there is no possibility of submitting a unified report from the Parliamentary Delegation –
“We all agreed that the Indian situation is one of almost explosive urgency.- – – -. Passionate mass feeling is liable to get out of hand.- – – – -. The INA and Subhas Bose have become emotionally idolized in many areas, to sad perplexity of loyal members of the Indian Army”.44
Some writings of the members in various publications were more drastic and telling45. The observations of the members exposed the stark reality of the Indian scene. Major W. Wyatt wrote – “.
“- – – But if the British failed to find soon a way of handing over smoothly, there may first be a revolution to drive them out” (emphasis in original). R.W. Sorensen wrote that “Circumstances this time have been far less favourable to Britain than in 1857” because of involvement of a much larger number of people everywhere in India, uncertainty regarding the deployment of the Indian Army, and the terrific strain suffered by the British due to the war. He concluded –“In short, we were able to bear the strain in those days, but we could not do so today without the probability of cracking under it”.
3.5 The Fourth Step – Cabinet Mission
3.5.1 Initiation
The announcement of sending a Parliamentary Delegation to India [vide Section 3.4.2], however, did not make any change in the explosive situation.
On 27 December 1945, the Viceroy wrote to the Secretary of State “As time goes on the loyalty of the Indian officials, the Indian Army and the Police might become problematical. A large number of British Officials will probably take the first opportunity to retire”.46
Again on 31 December, he wrote to the King George VI – “We must somehow secure agreement (between Congress and Muslim League) and avoid an upheaval, which will be a great deal more serious than in 1942, but I confess that I don’t quite know how it is going to be done”.47
While the Parliamentary Delegation was visiting India, the HMG climbed down further. On 22 January 1946, the Cabinet accepted the recommendation of its India and Burma Committee to send a Cabinet Mission consisting of three Cabinet rank Ministers to India. It was decided that discussions with the Indian leaders should not be continued by the Viceroy (who was doing so as was decided about five months back – vide Section 3.3 paragraph 3), but by the Mission, and all possible steps were to be taken to ensure that the talks did not fail. It was feared “civil disobedience might start as passive disobedience but would not stop at that. The Indian Army, while not likely to mutiny, might be unwilling to intervene to maintain order and there might be a complete breakdown of the administration”.48
3.5.2 Announcement of Visit
On 14 February 1946, in a top secret telegram Auchinlek wrote to Allanbrooke – “It can be realized therefore that if the worst comes to the worst British Troops will be the only stable element in the country and unless the essential key points (Delhi, Karachi, Bombay, Madras and Calcutta) can be held with reassurable(sic) certainty, the maintenance of these troops may well become impossible”.49
On 18February 1946(i.e. within a week of the return of the Parliamentary Delegation to England), revolt broke out in the Royal Indian Navy (RIN) followed by repercussions in the other branches of the armed forces as was told earlier in Sections 2.2 and 2.4.
It might or might not be just a coincidence that on the very next day, Pethik-Lawrence announced that the earlier decision of sending to India a Cabinet Mission would be given effect to.
3.6 The Fifth Step – Decision to Grant Full Independence
Finally, the HMG declared its decision to leave India. The statement of Attlee in the British Parliament on 15 March 1946 (a few days prior to the Cabinet Mission was to start for India) was revealing – “I find from my friends in the House who had been out to India and returned, from letters received from Indians and from Englishmen in India of all points of view, complete agreement on the fact that India is in a state of great tension and this is indeed a critical moment. At the present moment the idea of nationalism is running very fast in India – – – . Today, I think that the national idea has spread right through not the least perhaps among some of those soldiers who had rendered such wonderful services in the war. I shall like today, therefore, not to stress so much the differences
between the Indians,- – – –”.
He, added – “India herself must choose what will be her future constitution; what will be her position in the world. I hope that the Indian people may elect to remain within British Commonwealth- – – – . But if she does so elect it must be her own free will- – – – . If, on the other hand, she elects for independence, in our view she has a right to do so.”50
4.The Last Phase
4.1 Speedy Changeover – Compulsions
The need for a fast change-over was felt by both the British regime and Congress leadership. Nehru admitted to Leonard Moseley that due to their old age they were averse to continue with further struggle for an undivided India, and moreover Gandhi did not give such a call.51 This was corroborated also by Wavell.52 More importantly the apprehension that freedom movement might be taken over by revolutionary leadership acted as the prime mover.
On 27 January 1946, Nehru wrote to Stafford Cripps (President of the Board of Trade, HMG; later visited India as a member of the Cabinet Mission) that there were a considerable number of young men who are convinced that only out of a big struggle can something worthwhile be achieved. They have hardened and they represent the prevailing sentiment of the Indian people. If change-over is delayed “events take the reins and go ahead leading to what I do not know” .53 Gandhi, in a press release on 23 February 1946 (5 days after the RIN revolt broke out), said that “The rulers have declared their intention to ‘quit’ in favour of Indian rule. Let the action be not delayed by a moment because of the exhibition of distressful unrest which has been lying hidden in the breast” .54
In an undated note (plausibly in end of March 1946), F. Turnbull, Secretary to the Cabinet Mission, wrote to the Under-Secretary of State, HMG that there might be problems on various issues regarding transfer of power, but, “the only hope is that the big boys of Congress and the League are said to be much alarmed that their followers break loose and of Russia”.55
4.2 Transfer of Power
The visit (23 March to 29 June 1946) of the Cabinet Mission (proposing a free united India in a loose federation), its failure due to various reasons, “Direct Action” by the Muslim League inciting large-scale communal violence etc have not been covered in this discourse as those are outside its scope.
However, it is important to note the following. Attlee appointed Admiral Louis Mountbatten replacing Wavell as Viceroy with a mandate that power must be transferred by 30 June 1948 at the latest. Mountbatten joined on 24 March 1947, and completed his task on 15 August 1947 (i.e. taking less than five months though the stipulated time was fifteen months) – partitioning the country into India and Pakistan.
Fortunately enough for the Congress (and the Muslim League) and the British regime, revolutionary leadership did not emerge, and Transfer of Power with Dominion Status and Partition was accomplished in an astronomical speed through the coveted constitutional path of negotiations, and finally through an enactment in the British Parliament – “A measured delivery to Indians of the instruments of governance, in the manner of the father handing the car keys to his son”, as observed by the American historian Peter W Fay.56
5. Attlee’s Personal View
The responsibilities of the opinions expressed and decisions taken by the His Majesty’s Government of United Kingdom regarding India in this period rest naturally with C R Attlee, the then British Prime Minister. Still then, it would be worthwhile to look into his personal view regarding the matter.
Lord Clement Attlee visited India in 1956, and was a guest in the Raj Bhavan, Calcutta (now Kolkata), the official residence of the Governor of West Bengal, for two days. Justice P B Chakraborty, the then Chief Justice of the High Court at Calcutta, was the Acting Governor. Justice Chakraborty asked Attlee about the voluntary British withdrawal from India, particularly in view of the facts that Quit India movement(1942) practically died out long back and the Allies own the war. The latter cited many reasons, but emphasized that the activities of Netaji which weakened the very foundation of the attachments of the British Indian armed forces was the most important one, adding in utter disdain that Gandhiji’s movements had minimal effect.57(i)
In 1960, Attlee repeated his above statement during conversation with Mr. Barun De(from India) and Mr. Kamal Hossain(from Pakistan – East) in the cafeteria of the Nuffield College, Oxford. Mr. De was then a Ph D Scholar in History in Oxford, and has since been an eminent historian. Mr. Hossain was a Ph D Scholar in Law, and later, was instrumental in writing the Constitution of independent Bangladesh. Attlee was an alumnus of Oxford.57(ii)
It would be interesting here to quote Attlee’s observation after Britsh India’s entry into the war – “Although Indian leaders had no sympathy with Japanese imperialism, there were men who would see in the Japanese advance the opportunity of throwing off what they considered to be the imperial yoke from the neck of India. Indeed, Subhas Bose of Bengal was busily engaged in forming, from some of Indian prisoners taken by the Japanese, an Indian National Army. Just as the defeat of Russia by Japan at the beginning of the century had intensified Asiatic nationalism, so it was clear to me that immediately the war ended Britain would be met by a very strong demand for equality on the part of Asians, who saw domination of Asians by Europeans in decline”.58
6. Concluding Observations
6.1 India’s Freedom
It has now been clearly and definitively established [in Sections 2 to 5] that the most important factor causing the speedy British withdrawal from India was the INA phenomenon. Consequently, all other theories regarding this matter (viz. last phase of implementation of an old policy by the HMG – granting freedom to India gradually, gift by the Labour Party, victory won by the Congress led by Gandhiji, etc.) fall through, or at the best, go to the back seats. Still then, the issues concerning the HMG would be discussed – though very briefly.
According to Moore, the HMG, controlled mainly by non-Labour governments hitherto, was “concerned primarily with underpinning imperial governance with Indian collaborative structures. Attlee’s government viewed the Indian problem from a post-imperial perspective, seeking nationalist succession compatible with British economic interests, the stability of the sub-continent, and the security of the Indian Ocean area. In consequence, an overriding value was placed upon the cooperation of the Congress and maximizing Indian unity”.59
But, as has been shown above [in Sections 3.2 and 3.3], the Labour Party, even after the war, could not come out of the imperial legacy. It offered, in two steps, only something akin to the Cripps’ Proposal (a scheme to bestow self governance, but with many lacunae) on 19 September 1945. It was originally presented in March 1942 by the Cripps Mission instituted by the war-time all party Cabinet of the HMG at the initiative of the Labour Party with a view to buy Indian support in the war effort after Burma was overrun by Japan. This offer can be thought of as the outcome of any one or more of the three theories regarding India’s freedom and self interest of Britain.
Nevertheless, within a very short span of six months, on 15 March 1946 to be specific, the HMG climbed down in a few quick steps in response to the prevailing situation created by the INA phenomenon to offer full independence even outside the Commonwealth [vide Sections 3.4 to 3.6]. While being gradually compelled to decide to leave India, the Labour Party pursued, in vain, the objectives stated by Moore. It is worthwhile to add here Attlee’s observation (without, of course, any elaboration) – “Colonialism of the old kind, with its virtues and defects, is out of place in the modern world”.60 Anyway, the HMG had to take recourse to the best option available then.
In this context, the following texttaken from a Secret Cabinet Paper (Conclusions of a meeting held on 31 December 1946 at 10, Downing Street, London) would be highly interesting to study – “The general feeling of the Cabinet was that withdrawal from India need not appear to be forced upon us by our weakness nor to be the first step in the dissolution of the Empire. On the contrary the action must be shown to be the logical conclusion, which we welcome, of a policy followed by successive governments for many years.” It was a irony that the same Cabinet Paper also contained – “If the Viceroy was correct in his estimate that we should in any case be unable to continue effectively to rule India beyond the early part of 1948,- – – – , then it would be well of derive whatever advantage we could from the early announcement of action which would, in fact, be inevitable.”61
The long and the short of the above is that the HMG only pretended to show a brave and benevolent face, even when on admittedly forced retreat, trying to project and propagate a totally untenable proposition. It was also a fact that leaving India, indeed, marked the beginning of the dissolution of the British Empire – that too at a very fast pace.
The political victory of the militarily defeated INA and its then absent Netaji, was thus snatched by
the Congress and the Muslim League. What was accepted by the Indian leaders was the antithesis of all that Netaji and his INA stood and fought for. The sub-continent was plunged into history’s greatest communal turmoil, giving birth to two states perpetually in conflicts.
6.2 Related Issues
A very important issue, viz., the blatant opportunism shown by the Congress regarding Netaji and INA has not been dealt with in the present work as it is thought to be outside the scope of its central thesis. Both Ghosh and Maity have covered this aspect to some extent. This issue, including relevant facts of the earlier period and post independence years till date, together with attitudes (regarding Netaji) of other political parties, will be a very interesting area of study.
Moreover, the author feels that serious research studies should be undertaken on other related matters (even if some studies have already been done in some areas), viz., the causes behind the widespread communal outburst right after a period of communal harmony; the factors which compelled Mountbatten and the HMG to highly scale down the stipulated time period for withdrawal, knowing quite well that in the then India there was no possibility of ascendancy of revolutionary leadership; the performances of the Indian leaders during this period and their implications on the people of the sub-continent; political, economic and other benefits, if any, reaped by Great Britain after transferring power in such a way etc.
Acknowledgement
This ARTICLE is an adoption from an earlier one (by this author) entitled “NETAJI, INA AND INDIA’S FREEDOM – ATTLEE’S VIEW’ published in “The DAWN”(An Organ of the National Council of Education, Bengal; Kolkata, India), Vol. II, No. 5(December 2010).
It is a pleasure to state that the matters of the Sections 2, 3 and 4.1 have been taken mainly from the referred works of Prof. K.K. Ghosh and Mr. G.C. Maity – although the choice of materials, and mode and style of presentation belong to the present author.
References and Notes
1. Toye H (1959) : The Springing Tiger – A Study of Subhas Chandra Bose, London ; pp 168-175
2. Edwards , M(1963) : The Last Years of British India, London; pp 96, 103-105
3. Ghosh K K (1969) : The Indian National Army – Second Front Of The Indian Independence Movement, Meerut; pp 198-251
4. Lebra Joyce C (1971) : Jungle Alliance – Japan and The Indian National Army, Singapore; pp 200-209, 217, 219
5. Corr G H (1975) : The War of the Springing Tiger, London; pp 172-176
6. Majumdar, R C (1977) : History of the Freedom Movement In India – Vol. III(2nd Revised Edition), Calcutta;
pp 608-610, 618-620
7. Sarkar Sumit (1983) : Modern India 1885-1947, New Delhi ; pp 410-421, 418-425
8. Sareen T R (1986) : Japan And The Indian National Army, Delhi; pp 165-177, 186-188
9. Chandra Bipan et al(1989) : India’s Struggle for Independence, New Delhi ; pp 475-492
10. Gordon L A (1990) : Brothers Against the Raj – A Biography of Sarat and Subhas Chandra Bose, New Delhi; pp 550-556
11. Fay Peter W (1993) : The Forgotten Army – India’s Armed Struggle for Independence 1942-1945, Ann Arbor ; pp 493-524
12. Bayly C & Harper T (2004) : Forgotten Armies – Britain’s Asian Empire & The War With Japan, London; p 463
13. For a fair assessment the following may be consulted-
i) Ghosh op. cit [3]; pp 166-197
ii) Saito & Hayashida (1973): “To Delhi To Delhi” in A Beacon Across Asia, Bose. S. K. et all (ed), London.; pp 164-178
iii) Fay: op. cit [11]; pp 239-360
14. Maity G C (2006) : “Decisive Role of the INA in India’s Freedom“ in Ghosh Ratna (ed) – Netaji Subhas Chandra
Bose and India’s Freedom, Vol. II, New Delhi; pp 226-275
(Also published in Asian Studies, Vol. XXI – Nos. 1 & 2, 2003; Kolkata)
15. Ghosh: op. cit[3]; p 206(with references to original sources)
16. (i) Ram Moti(1946): Two Historic Trials in Red Fort, New Delhi
(ii) Moseley Leonard(1961): The Last Days of The British Raj, London; p 137
17. Maity op. cit [14]; pp 245-246, 248, 250, 262-264 (with references to original sources)
18. (i)Maity: op. cit[14] pp 233-238, pp 241-242;(with references to original sources);(ii) Chandra: op. cit [9]; p 479
19. Toye: op. cit[1]; p 170 (Cited in Ghosh op. cit [3]; p 227)
20. Tuker F (1950) : While Memory Serves, London; p 43 (Cited in Ghosh op. cit [3]; p 230)
21. Ghosh : op. cit [3] ; pp 230-232 (with references to original sources)
22. Sarkar : op. cit [7] ; pp 423-425
23. Bandyopadhyay S. (2004) : From Plassey To Partition, Hyderabad; pp 175-176
24. Mansergh et. al (eds) (1976) : INDIA – The Transfer Of Power 1942-47, Vol. VI, London ; p 1076
(Hereafter referred to as TOP)
25. Ghosh : op. cit[3], p 235 (with references to original sources)
26. Tendulkar D G (1953) : Mahatma – Life of Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi – Vol. VII, Bombay;
(i)pp 77-78(Cited in Ghosh op. cit [3]; p 224); (ii) p 113
27. (i) Gopal S (Ed) (1981) : Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Vol. 14; p 211(Hereafter referred to as SWJN)
(cited in Maity op. cit[14]; p 248)
(ii) Gopal S (Ed) (1981) : ibid., Vol. 14; pp 279-280 (Cited in Maity op. cit [14]; pp 279-280)
(iii) Gopal S(Ed)(1982) : ibid. , Vol. 15, p 92 (Cited in Maity op. cit [14]; p 238)
28. Sitaramayya P (1947): The History of Indian National Congress, Vol. II, Bombay; p 784
(Cited in Ghosh op. cit [3]; p 224)
29. Geetasree Bandyopadhyay (2009) : “Non-Violence in Action – Enchantments and Disenchantments” in Bulletin of
Ramakrishna Mission Institute of Culture, Vol. LX, No. 106, Kolkata; pp 462-468
30. Maity: op. cit [14];(i) pp 228-229 and(ii) p 229 (both with references to original sources)
31. Maity: op. cit [14]; pp 250-253 (with references to original sources)
32. TOP VI : op. cit [24]; pp 95-97
33. TOP VI : op. cit [24]; p 197 (Cited in Maity op. cit [14]; p 232)
34. TOP VI : op. cit [24]; pp 282-283 (Cited in Maity op. cit [14]; p 246)
35. Indian Annual Register, Vo. II (1945); p 93 (Cited in Ghosh: op. cit [3]; p 203)
36. Moon P (ed) (1973) : Wavell – The Viceroy’s Journal, London; pp 173, 225 (Hereafter referred to as VJ)
(Cited in Maity op. cit [14]; p 253)
37. TOP VI : op. cit [24]; pp 451-452 (Cited in Maity op. cit [14]; p 249)
38. VJ : op. cit [36]; p 181 (Cited in Maity op. cit [14]; p 254)
39. TOP VI : op. cit [24]; pp 482-483 (Cited in Maity op. cit [14]; p 225)
40. TOP VI : op. cit [24]; p 512-515
41. TOP VI : op. cit [24]; pp 578-583 (Cited in Maity op. cit [14]; p 255-256)
42. TOP VI : op. cit [24]; p 561 (Cited in Maity op. cit [14]; p 257)
43. TOP VI : op. cit [24]; pp 947, 950, 984
44. TOP VI : op. cit [24]; p 1180
45. i) Ghosh op. cit [3]; pp 241-243
ii) Maity op. cit [14]; pp 258-259
(Both with references to original sources)
46. TOP VI : op. cit [24]; p 687 (Cited in Maity op. cit [14]; p 257)
47. TOP VI : op. cit [24]; p 715 (Cited in Maity op. cit [14]; p 257)
48. TOP VI : op. cit [24]; p 786,830-833; also VJ : op. cit [36]; p 206 (Cited in Maity op. cit [14]; pp 256-257)
49. TOP VI : op. cit [24]; p 976
50. UK House of Commons Parliamentary Debate, 420 (1945-46), Columns 1418-1422
(Cited in Ghosh: op. cit [3]; p 246)
51. Mosley L (1961): The Last Days of the British Raj, London; p 248 (Cited in Maity op. cit [14]; p 266)
52. VJ: op cit[36]; p 225 (Cited in Maity op. cit [14]; p 267)
53. SWJN, Vol. 14: op cit[27(i)]; pp 141-142, 146 (Cited in Maity op. cit [14]; p 267)
54. Govt. of India (1981): The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi, Vol. 83; p 17
(Cited in Maity op. cit [14]; p 267)
55. TOP VII (1978): op cit [24]; p 72 (Cited in Maity op. cit [14]; p 267)
56. Fay: op cit [11]; p 3
57. (i) Majumdar: op. cit[6]; pp 609-610
(ii) De Barun(2007): “Experiment With Truth In A Fractured Land” in The Telegraph(30/01/2007),Kolkata; p 13
58. Attlee C R(1954): As It Happened, London; pp 209-10
59. Moore R J (1988): Endgames of Empire – Studies of Britain’s Indian Problem; Delhi; pp 1 – 2
60. Attlee: op cit[58]; p 221
61. British Library Website – www.bl.uk/collections/independancetransfer4.htm
The Author may be contacted at – Ph: +91 33 24727029(Resi); + 91 9433356873(M)
e-mail: akmajhi@rediffmail.com